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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SANCTITY OF A
PROPERTY INTEREST IN A RIPARIAN RIGHT
The riparian doctrine of water law developed in the eastern United
States when water was abundant.' The system is based on the
"reasonable rights" of property owners adjacent to a stream to use the
abundant water supply and its effect is to limit access to those persons
who hold land adjacent to the water source.2 But the abundant water
supply has vanished. In its place is the need to completely maximize
the use of the available water supplies." This change gives rise to several
specific criticisms of the traditional riparian system. First, it restricts
water use to riparian lands. Secondly, it creates uncertainty, since it
decides whether a water use is permissible in terms of reasonableness.
Finally, its lack of administrative controls necessitates burdensome
litigation to determine the "reasonableness" of a proposed new use.I
In response to these criticisms, legislation has been proposed which
would alter the basic riparian system by providing for administrative
I t RK WTER% X\D NN ATER RIGHTS § 4.1 (1967) [Hereinafter cited as CLARK]; see F.
Tin-mi %%I. It BIOIIXLE\TIIAL & J GERALD. N',TURL RESOURCEs 2 (1965); Ellis. Water Law
in th I astern I n i tacll StfO(. J1 SOIL XND WATER CONSERVATION 19 (1963).
2 Murph%. I Nh,,rt (ourv im Ifat ,c Law for the Eastern United States, 1961 WAsH, U.L.Q.
93.q4,
3 ,'c Sa~ille. U ,al Pr,,bhemis Ir irng Front the Changing Water Needs. Uses. and
4vadubihIt v Wl atcr tn ithe Lastern U tnted Stats, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAw 25, 28
(195M) iltereinaftcr cited as \X ,Tt-R RtsotRucS].
Proles.or O'Connell summarizes the development of the demands as follows:
In 1900. the United States u ed 40 billion gallons of water per day; in 1930, it used 92
billion gallons. in 1940. 135 billion gallons: in 1955. 262 billion; in 1960, 312 billion.
During these siitN Near-. the total supply of readily available fresh water has been 515
billion gallons per day. By 1975 it is predicted that the total daily use will reach 453 billion
gallon% ol the a.ailablc 515 (an increase, it %%ill be noted, of more than ten fold since 1900).
In order to maintain the preient ratio of supply to use. 755 billion gallons will be needed.
I hus shortages loom
O'( onnell. bo' \i ater Statutc The Constitutionality of Regulating Ddsting Use of
Miir'r 47 loxk N L RFX 549. 553 11962)
the primar% causc of these increased iaatcr consumption rates are population growth, industrial
growth, and nv" and easier irrigation techniques for agriculture. Id. at 554-55. See also Murphy,
4 "h,,rt ( ours i fatcr Lau for tih Laitern United Stares, 1961 WASH. U.LQ. 93.
4 Scr Plager s. Maloney. orergmcg Pattrn. for Regulation of Consunptive Use of Water in
thf, I (orrn f rulcd S'ncs, 43 INo L.J 3183 383-84 (1967-68) [Hereinafter cited as Plager
Ma loneNI
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supervision of all future water allocation.' Since the riparian right is a
property right,6 any modification of it must be consistent with due
process of law.7 Under the proposed legislation, no compensation is
given riparians for the modification of their rights. If the modifications
are only a regulation, they are allowable under the police power
without compensation. If the modifications amount to a taking of
property, however, they require compensation to be consistent with due
process.' To decide whether these changes are a taking which demands
compensation, it is necessary to consider (1) the specific legal qualities
of the riparian right and (2) the exact changes the proposed
modifications will make in this property right.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RIPARIAN RIGHT
Because water moves with an everchanging flow and is in a constant
state of flux,9 the property right here considered is only a right to use
the water while it passes by in a flowing stream.'0 This right is called
5. See e.g.. IOWA CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 455 A. 19 (Supp. 1969). See also Heath, Water
Management Legislation in the Eastern States. 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 99 (1967); Plager &
Maloney 383-84. See generally Ziergler, Statutory Regulation ol Water Resources in WATI R
RESOURCES 87, 97-103.
The majority of the proposed legislation follows those proposals made by the State Law
Commissioners. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATL LAWS.
MODEL WATER USE ACT in WATER RESOURCES 566 [Hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT §
I.
6. See Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property'. in WATER RESOURCES 133 [Hereinafter cited
as Lauer]. Even under the modern definitions of property as an economic benefit, water is
regarded as a property right. Cribbet, Changing Concepts in the Law oi Land Use. 50 IOWA L.
REV. 245 (1965); Note, Diminishing Property Rights. 69 W. VA. L. REV. 170 (1966-67).
7. U.S. CONST. amends. V. & XIV; Plager & Maloney 386. The constitutionality of acts
modifying the basic water rights has been discussed before as early as 1935. Comment, 34 MICII.
L. REV. 274 (1935).
8. It should be noted that no legislature will deliberately enact a law that is either certain to
be declared an unconstitutional infringement of private rights or would require the payment of
large sums from the public coffers to compensate the all too numerous injured riparian owners.
LAUER, 138; PLAGER & MALONEY 386.
9. Water moves in a never-ending cycle from the ocean to the clouds, then to the earth in rain,
and finally back to the ocean through the rivers. This is the hydrologic cycle. A final solution to
the problems of water law must recognize the particular phenomenon and account for the impact
that it has on any attempt to define the property right one has in water. See generall/ Piper &
Thomas, Hydrology in Water Law: What is Their Future Common Ground. in WATUR
RESOURCES 7.
10. Mitchell v. Warner. 5 Conn. 497. 518 (1825); see Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472. 474
(D.R.I. 1827). See also Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 525 (1866). See generallyt Dilling v. Murray,
6 Ind. 324, 327 (1855).
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a usufruct." The positive attributes of the usufruct are the riparian's
right to have a stream reach his land substantially undiminished,2 and
the right to initiate at any time any use that is not unreasonable.
13
The usufruct is restricted to the owners of land adjacent to the
stream." The owners of the adjacent property are restricted to uses
permitted by the physical qualities of the land. For example, the
riparian may not use the water of a stream on any land that is not in
the %%atershed of the stream.' Riparian uses are restricted further by
I1 \ usufruct i "[tJhc right to enjo a thing, the property of which is vested in another, and
to dras from the Name all the profit, utity, and advantage which it may produce, provided it be
without alterinLg the ,ubstancvs of the thing " BL\CK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1712 (4th ed. 1951).
12 I arl% in the hibtor\ of riparian rights, the courts developed the "natural flow" doctrine.
Under this theory each riparian had a right to have the full and natural flow of a stream reach
his land undiminished either in quahtN or quantity. See, e.g., Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241, 248
(184), Wharton v stexcns, 84 Iowa 107. 110-11, 50 N.W. 562, 564 (1891); F. TRELEASE. H.
1111lliMi\niXi & J GRULD. N.-XrLR\i RESOuRCES 116-17 (1965). The incompatibility of this
rule \kith the riparian right to use the %,ater of a stream led to its early abandonment in favor of
the present rule of "reasonable use." I Ci xRk 16.2. This rule was fully articulated in Dumont
v. Kellogg. 29 \ich 420. 422 (1574). It was first announced by Justice Story in Tyler v.
Wilkinson. 24 1 (as 472 (D.R . 1527).
\X betleen proprictors, the right of each qualifies that of the other. The question is not
sshelher one sufters damage from another's use, but whether under all the circumstances
ol the casc one'., use of the vlater is reasonable and consistent with a corresponding
cnjox ment of his right bN another 'In other words, the injury that is incidental to a
reasonable enjoN menit of the common right can command no redress.'
Ci AR K 16 2 at 09, citing Durnont v. Kellogg. 29 Mich. 420,425 (1874).
I 1 or the hitorical dcxelopment of the right to the future as well as the current uses of water,
sec - (sOt i i L x 4)1 9"xTERs 205 (18)3: e.g.. Redwater Land & Canal Co. v. Jones, 27
S I) 194. 131 N \\ S5 19l 1); Redlater Land & Canal Co. v. Reed, 26 S.D. 466, 128 N.W.
702 (11(10). Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. C)clone Ditch Co., 15 S.D. 519, 91 N.W. 352 (1902).
14 Iler v ilkinson, 24 F Cas 472, 474 (1827). There are several theoretcial bases for this
limitation, nonc of shich adequatel, explains its existence. The earliest theory, derived from
Roman las%. Aa that all of the later was "res communes," the use of which was free to all
persons I aucr at 177. Beginning in the early nineteenth century the doctrine of community
ossnership began to be restricted. The most logically sound theory for this restriction was that of
the ,iscon'on supreme Court. "The riparians exclusive right to the use of water arises directly
from the fact that non-riparians haxe no right of access to the stream without trespass upon
riparian lands Munninghoff v. Wi onsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 254, 38
N 1 2d 712. 7 t (1940) I ora comprehensise development of this topic, see Lauer 178-85.
%5 Murphs, I IShort (onrwc on l a ,ter Lioi o[ the Eastern United States, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q.
93. 90 [he hasic thcory of this point of view is that "[tihe natural stream, existing by the bounty
of prmidencc for the benefit of the land through which it flows, is an incident annexed, by
operation oi Law, to the land itself - Tyler %. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (D.R.I. 1827).
The right ol the riparian ts subjected to numerous other limitations as well. See generally' Lauer
22 1-54. Morreale, Federal Pa r i! stern lfaters%: The Navigation Power arid the Rule oJ Vo
( i'o,, . 3 N \T Ri-soL R( -', J. I 19063): Woodbridge, Rights of the States in Their Natural
R i,,,,cs Partul/ri a\ Ipp/hd to Htarer. 5 S.C.L.Q. 130 (1952).
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the co-relative rights of all other riparians to the use of a stream. If
there is a conflict between the riparian uses, it is settled by the
application of the doctrine of "reasonable use."'" If the riparian's use
is "reasonable" in light of all the surrounding circumstances, 7 he may
use,18 and even divert,'" the waters of the stream. Some uses that have
been found unreasonable per se are pollution,"0 non-riparian use2' and
municipal use.22 If conflicting riparian uses are not unreasonable per
se, two approaches have been used to test reasonableness. 23 Some courts
treat the problem as sui generis between the parties and determine the
reasonableness of competing uses by the isolated facts of the case
before the court.24 Other courts refer to previous determinations of
reasonableness and apply it to the facts before them." No matter which
approach is followed, reasonableness depends on the facts which
individual courts consider important.2 1 Specific facts to which courts
have accorded weight in making this determination are the respective
location of the parties on the stream, 27 priority in time,28 and the value
16. See note 12, supra.
17. See, e.g.. Harris v. Brook, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
18. Murphy, A Short Course in Water Lawobr the Eastern United States. 1961 WAsh. U.L.Q.
93.
19. Id.
20. See. e.g., Arminis Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459 (1912). See generali
Agnor, Riparian Right in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 141, 144 (1952). Today this is
handled primarily by statutory pollution control. See Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law
Elements in Riparian Doctrine States. 10 BuF. L. REv. 448, 454 (1961).
21. See, e.g.. Williams v. Wadsworth, 51 Conn. 277 (1883); Town of Gordonsvillc v. Zinn, 129
Va. 542, 106 S.E. 408 (1921). Some states refuse to recognize this rule, see, e.g.. Gillis v. Chase,
76 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18 (1891); Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt. 240, 56 A. 1106 (1904); while others hold
that relief may be obtained only when non-riparian use interferes with a reasonable use, see. e.g..
Stratton v. Mt. Herman Boys School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913). However, non-riparians
can acquire by prescription a right that is superior even to the rights of riparians. See llis, Some
Legal Aspects of Water Use in North Carolina. in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION 189, 336
(Haber & Bergan ed. 1956) [Hereinafter cited as WATER ALLOCATION]; Harnsberger, Preswriptive
Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 WIS. L. REv. 47.
22. See. e.g., Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130 (1854); Pernell v. Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.L.2d
449 (1941). But see Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902). See generally Marguis.
Freeman & Heath, The Movement for New Water Rights in the Tennesee Vall"r States. 23
TENN. L. REV. 797, 813 (1955); Sax, Municipal Water Suppr lOr Nonresidents: Recent
Developments and Suggestions for the Future. 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 54 (1965). Set alio Lauer
196-211.
23. Lauer 196-98.
24. See. e.g., Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964); Lauer 196.
25. See. e.g.. Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950); Lauer 197-98.
26. See J. SAX, WATER LAW PLANNING AND POLICY 204 (1968).
27. See. e.g.. Gehlen Bros. v. Knarr, 101 Iowa 700, 70 N.W. 757 (1897).
28. See. e.g.. Harris v. Brook, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
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of the use to society.2 Courts consistently have granted priority only
to domestic' or natural uses.' Thus, every riparian owner has an
absolute right to the use of the water for necessities even if this use
results in consumption of the entire stream.3 2 No clear set of priorities
has been developed for other possible uses.3
The right to initiate a use at any future time34 and the possibility that
a long established valuable use could be displaced or reduced in favor
of another riparian's claim, 7 results in a lack of security for the
riparians. This often precipitates litigation. 6 A riparian who has used
the ,"ater of a stream for mining purposes for twenty years might have
his use reduced or ended in favor of another riparian who wished to
use the water for irrigation purposes.
II. STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS
The proposals to change the riparian system have aimed primarily
at the restrictive characteristics of the old system. The proposed
legislation attempts to regulate water use at its initiation .3  The
universal approach has been the adoption of a permit system patterned
after the proposals introduced in the Model Water Use Act.3
The developers of the permit system had two objectives: abolition of
29 See. c v, Taylor ,. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950).
Sax states that "courts usually give no weight to either priority in time, or to position on the
stream " I S-x\, 'ATER Lxw PL-XNNI\G AND POLICx 204 (1968).
30 See Beuscher, -tppropriation Ifater Law Elements in Riparian Doctrine States. 10 BUF.
L. Ri% 448. 452 (196 1).
31 Id Seealso 6A A\1FRiC(xN LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.57 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954).
32 See note 30, supra
33 -1 SAX WAILR Lx w PL-XNING AND POLIcY 206 (1968). For an example of the methods
of statutorN priority formation that have been used in the appropriation law states, see. e.g.. TEX.
Ru\ Cix Si\T A\N art. 7471 (1959). The Texas approach follows the basic format of most
western states when it uses the following priorities:
I Domestic and Municipal Uses
2 Manufacturing Uses
3 Irrigation Uses
4 Mining Uses
5 Hydro-Electric Uses
6 Naxigation Uses
7 Rec:reation and Pleasures Uses
34 S'e note 13, \upra
3S J SAX, VATER L-\w PLANNING AND POLIcY 206 (1968).
36. Id, Plager & Maloney, 383-84.
37 Heath, Water Management Legi\Iatzon in the Eastern States. 2 LAND & WATER L. REV.
99 (1967). Plager & Maloney 383.
35 ee note 5, vupra
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the riparian's right to institute any reasonable future use" and the
creation of both security and flexibility within the system." The need
for security is the product of the dependence of the public upon private
enterprises to develop natural resources." Any system choosing private
enterprise as the primary force for resource development 2 must provide
sufficient security to attract capital investment. 3 Simultaneously,
however, there must be sufficient flexibility in permitting the initation
of different uses to encourage development and the maximization of
beneficial use."
To realize these objectives, the permit system freezes the existing uses
of water at the time of the system's inception. 5 After a permit system
becomes effective, a permit must be obtained from a central
administrative agency charged with the supervision of water resource
development in order to initiate a use. 6 Current uses must be registered
to be preserved." Failure to register a use may result in its restriction"
or destruction. 9 In order to maximize the beneficial uses of water, the
system gives broad discretion to the agency to establish priorities in the
issuance of permits.50 This also provides flexibility. Setting a fixed
duration for the permit provides security." The duration of the permit
must be long enough to make capital investment feasible."
The most significant alteration of riparian rights is the
administrative agency's power to issue a permit for the use of water
without regard to the common law restrictions on the riparian's use.53
This provision, operating in conjunction with the provision abolishing
39. Plager & Maloney 386-87.
40. Id.
41. Trelease, Policies.for Water Law: Property Rights. Economic Forces, and Public
Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 67 (1965).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 23.
44. Saville, Legal Problems Arising Front the Changing Needs. Uses. and /1 vailability ol
Water in Eastern United States, in WATER RESOURCES 25.
45. This is almost complusory in lieu of the property right held in an existing use, MODEL
ACT §§ 301-304.
46. See IOWA CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 455A.25 (Supp. 1969); MODEL ACT Part II.
47. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373-101 (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 559, 56-13 (Supp. 1969);
MODEL ACT § 303, COMMENT.
48. - IOWA CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 455 A.28 (Supp. 1969); MODEL ACT §§ 304,407-08.
49. See note 48, supra.
50. IOWA CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 455A.21 (Supp. 1969); MODEL ACT § 407.
51. IOWA CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 455A.20 (Supp. 1969) (10 year maximum); MODEL
ACT § 406 (50 year maximum).
52. See note 41,supra.
53. IOWA CODE ANN. tit. 17, §§ 455A.I-26 (Supp. 1969) (removing restriction to riparian
lands for domestic uses); MODEL AT § 407(c).
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the riparian's right to institute a future use"' without a permit, could
vest water rights in a non-riparian. The non-riparian, then, might be
able to use a water right to the exclusion of the riparian. This amounts
to taking a right from one individual and endowing another with its
beneficial use.
The transfer of a use outlined here is not an immediate or absolute
occurrence. The riparian under the permit system might be able to get
a permit for a greater amount of water or for a use that formerly would
have been found unreasonable. But this potential advantage for the
riparian does not affect the losses he will suffer under the permit
system The riparian may lose (1) a use of water to a non-riparian with
a more beneficial use; (2) the right to initiate any new reasonable use
at any time in the future; and (3) a monetary advantage since, under
the riparian system, the landowner can either sever his riparian right
from the land and sell it separately 5 or receive a higher value for the
land when the appurtenant water right is sold with it."
As these losses demonstrate, the taking of the riparian property right
will result in the diminution of the value of riparian lands. The question
is whether this change in the riparian system requires the payment of
compensation,'
54 Mom I \(I , 303.
55 Duckvorth v Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 110 P. 927 (1910); cf.
Carlsbad Mutual \\atcr Co. %. San Luis Re Development Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 900, 178 P.2d
844 1947). Smith v Stanoltnd Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P.2d 1002 (1946).
56 D~ugan % Rank, 372 U.S 609, 624-25 (1963).
57 [here 'would seem to be little question as to the states' power to regulate or prohibit the
exer.isc ot riparian right' ssherc the regulatory scheme is bottomed in public interest in the
benefiuial operation of the correlatiie rights of co-riparians. A similar relationship may be found
betvcn the oserlinsg osner' ol a single petroleum deposit. Under the doctrine of correlative
rights, the overling landoaner have the right to take as much oil and gas as may be captured
from a drilling site on their land subject to a duty not to engage in extraction practices injurious
to the Lomnion stock and, therefore, the other overlying landowners. See I W. SUMMERS. OIL
A. ) (\s ch 4. 5 il954), IA \W. Si lMMRe.. OIL AND GAs ch. 5 (1954). In the leading case
upholding the constjtutionaht of the regulation of petroleum extraction for conservation
purpos,,. Ohio Oil ( o. i. Indiana, 177 U S 190 (1900), the court relied heavily on the existing
overling landoxner's correlative rights as support for the imposition of restrictions on the
individual right to e\ploit the common source. Id at 204-11. It is questionable from the above
decision "hethcr the e\istencc of the corrclatise rights of the overlying landowners or the "'public
interest in the concrsation ol the natural resource, standing alone, would justify the imposition
of rcgulatorN measures In all subsequent cases challenging the recognition of petroleum rights,
the .ourt, ha'c relied at least in part upon the theory of correlative rights to justify the regulation.
Vet, I \ \\ St \ti s Of \\D G,., 106 (1954).
ihc analogs that may be dragon from this bodN of law and the statutory regulation of riparian
right, as hetaccn co-riparians. and overlying landowners is a function of the physical
Washington University Open Scholarship
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III. COMPENSABLE TAKING
There can be no argument with the statement that the government
is required to compensate for a "taking" of property but not for losses
resulting from mere regulation. 5 The generality of the statement,
however, prevents its use as a guide in deciding a specific case." This
area of the law has been aptly described as "a matter of confusion and
incompatible results,""0 leading to the accusation that the Court itself
does not have a controlling standard for differentiating between
regulation and a taking." This confusion is the result of the Court's
pragmatic, case-by-case approach. 2 This approach was developed by
Justice Holmes and is based on his theory that the role of the law in
these cases is to assure the "fair" resolution of the competing forces
of public need and private loss. What is "fair" in a particular case
must be determined by analyzing the exact effect of a regulatory
measure on the property right involved. 3 The test is whether the
regulation curtails the exercise of an established property right to
characteristics of the thing being shared. The constitutional validity of such regulation could
hardly be questioned. Thus it is the creation of a right to use water on non-riparian land in
derogation of riparian rights that poses the problem dealt with in the text.
58. Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964) [Hereinafter cited as Sax].
The history and development of the "compensation rule" under the Fifth Amendment has
involved a multitude of different factual settings created by the tremendous growth of government
activity in guiding and controlling the economic and environmental development of the country.
See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years ol Supreme Court
Expropriation Law. 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63 [hereinafter cited as Dunham]; King, Regulation of
Water Rights Under the Police Power in WATER RESOURCEs 271, 271-81; Sax 58-67.
The applicability of the due process limitation on the governmental power of the states to
regulate property was settled in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
The problem being dealt with here is the effect of governmental regulation on private property
interests. This must be distinguished from the destruction or diminution of property value
resulting from government activity. See. e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1944);
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d
580 (10th Cir.), cert. denied. 371 U.S. 955 (1962).
59. Sax at 37.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Court itself seems to admit the lack of consistancy in its results. See. e.g.. Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); United States v. Caltex Inc., 344 U.S. 149,
156 (1952). It should also be emphasized here that the considerations are not whether the taking
is by eminent domain or regulation. The question is whether within the concept of regulation,
the control of the harm by taking does not really confer a benefit on the public. This is not the
eminent domain power versus the police power. The concern here is completely within the realm
of the police power. The end is the same as payment. See Dunham 73-8 I.
62. Dunham 63-64.
63. Sax40-41.
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prevent its enjoyment from harming the public or only provides the
public with a positive asset." In the latter case, the regulation amounts
to a taking, and compensation must be paid.65 In the former, none is
required."
Historically, governmental power to regulate was further restricted
by the diminution of value test. If the diminution of value resulting
from governmental regulation approached complete destruction of the
property right, compensation was required; that the regulation was
aimed at removing a harm rather than securing a benefit was
irrelevant. 7 The viability of this restriction, however, is questionable
under recent case law.
Because the Court uses a case-by-case approach in determining
whether a regulatory scheme results in a compensable taking, any
attempt to predict the result of a new regulation requires extrapolation
from existing cases with facts analogous to those being considered in
the new regulation.
The cases most analogous to the proposed modifications of riparian
rights are those in which the government regulation or prohibition of
a land use result in the reduction of the value of the land to the owner.
The first two cases to be considered are Goldblatt v. Town of
Hemp'tead" and Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles.69
Both cases involved ordinances which prohibited the use of the land for
mining and resulted in almost total destruction of the land's economic
value to the owner. In both, the ordinances were justified by the
public's need to eliminate a potentially harmful condition.
In Goldblatt, after finding the evidence of loss insufficient to reach
the taking issue, the Court proceeded to discuss it at length. Though
paying tribute to the diminution of value test, the language of the
decision did not resolve the question of whether the complete
destruction of the economic value of the property would by itself
necessitate compensation. 70 In Consolidated Rock Products, with the
64 frclea, Poltuws /or Water Law Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public
Regulatitn. 5 NAT R[SOURCES J. 1, 37 (1965). See Dunham 63, 68-71.
65 S , c . Nashville, C. & St. L. RN v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
66 Goldblatt v. Toan of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Consolidated Rock Products Co.
v Los \ngele,, 57 Cal.2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 371 U-.S. 36
(1962) tf,,cf,. rallV Sax.
67 Sa\41
68 369 U S 590 (1962).
69 57 ( al.2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed. 371 U.S. 36 (1962); see
Note. 50 CAt L Rrv. 896 (1962).
70 369 11 S. 590 (1962); see Sax 42,
Vol. 1969: 3271
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total destruction of the economic value of the property having been
conclusively proved below, 71 the issue of compensability was squarely
presented on appeal. The Court dismissed per curiani for want of a
substantial federal question.12 Using the language of Goldblatt and the
result in Consolidated, it can be argued that even the total destruction
of property value alone is insufficient to require compensation if there
is a public need to eliminate an undesirable condition.
In both of these cases, the "public need" necessitating the
"regulation" was the result of a changed population distribution
causing the once acceptable physical condition of the land to become
a source of potential harm to the members of the community. In this
respect, they illustrate the proposition that "a prohibition or regulation
without compensation must compel an owner to eliminate a public evil
resulting from his activities and cannot compel him to act only to
promote the public interest by providing without cost something the
public wants." r
Nashville, Chicago & St. Louis Railway v. Walters7 illustrates the
situation in which a right was appropriated for the public benefit. A
statute required the railroad to separate a grade crossing from a state
highway allocating one-half the project's cost to the railroad. The
state's power to do -this under the proper conditions was not
questioned. 75 However, the railroad's position was that the present
requirement was founded not upon the need to elimate a hazardous
condition for the benefit of local traffic, but rather upon a program
designed to foster the public interest in the development of an improved
nation-wide automotive transportation system. The Court agreed. It
held that the objective did not justify compelling one individual to bear
the burden of an improvement benefitting the public at large. The
Court explicitly found that there was no harmful condition to be
eliminated.76
71. Note, 50 CAL. L. REV. 896 (1962).
72. While there is always some question about the significance of dismissal for want of a
federal question, it is technically a decision on the merits, and often used for precedent. See. Note,
Supreme Court Per Curianz Practice: A Critique, 69 HARv. L. REV. 707, 712 (1956); Note, The
Insubstantial Federal Question, 62 HARv. L. REV. 488, 494 (1949).
73. Dunham 75. The evils being eliminated may be such that the total destruction of the
property is warranted. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
74. 294 U.S. 405 (1935); Comment, 27 U. CHi. L. REV. 128, 161 (1959).
75. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 412 (1935). See Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953) (reaffirming the power to assess a railroad
for 50% of the costs under the proper circumstances).
76. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935); see Dunham 73.
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RIPARIAN RIGHTS
A third line of decisions are those dealing with the acquisition of
easements on the airspace over private property.7 In 1958, Congress
revised the Civil Aeronautics Act and defined navigable airspace
belonging to the public to include the space needed for approach
lanes.7 " The question was whether the effects resulting from this use of
airspace, pursuant to the statute, constituted a taking requiring that
compensation be paid. In Griggs v. .Alleghanv Count, 79 the noise and
vibrations of low-flying aircraft in an approach path to a municipal
airport rendered the complainant's property uninhabitable for
residential purposes. This was the only use made of the land. The Court
held that this constituted the taking of an air easement over the
complainant's land requiring compensation. " The effect of this case is
that the expectations of a private property holder to the enjoyment of
his land free from the above interferences may not be destroyed without
compensation. The public need for an approach to the airport to
augment the development of an air transportation system did not
justify the destruction of the private property holder's expectation of
quiet enjoyment of his land.,'
These decisions make clear that in order to decide whether the
proposed water right modifications are going to require compensation,
the relationship of the public to the property interest must be evaluated
before and after its impairment. This analysis must be made in terms
of the conflicting uses that the property owner and the public desire to
make of the property right. Applying this analysis to the proposed
modifications in the riparian system, the public's relationship of the
riparian's property interest before the change must be established first.
The riparian has the right to exclude all persons with the exception of
his co-riparians from the enjoyment of the use of the stream. The
public has no right to the use of a stream in the absence of ownership
of land contiguous to the stream. Even this provides the owner with
no more than the right to make a reasonable use of the water only upon
contiguous land. Thus, one of the expectations of the riparian owner
is freedom from competition from any source other than co-riparians
77. Grigg , Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946)
78. 49 U S C 1301 et. seq (1964)
79. 369 U S 84( 1962).
80. Id Set,, alsi, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S 256 (1946).
81. Dunharn 90.
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who are subject to the restrictions of the reasonable use doctrine. The
public's expectation in the right to use a stream may be considered the
converse of this.
The proposed modification would potentially result in the creation
of a public right to use a stream that would derogate the
riparian's rights. This may definitely be treated as an asset providing
a positive improvement in the public welfare. But, if the increasing
needs of the public for an available supply of water are severe enough
and there exists an inability to meet this need as a result of the
riparian's rights, the enjoyment of such rights may be treated as
producing a harmful effect in terms of social value and it would be
arguable that the Goldblatt and Consolidated cases would control.
When changed conditions have caused a once-acceptable use of
property to become a source of potential harm to the public, then its
destruction does not require compensation. Alternatively, if the existing
demands for water may be met under the present system and
modification of the riparian rights would provide simply a cheaper,
more efficient source of supply, then the effect of the modifications is
to provide the public with an asset for the improvement of the general
welfare.8 2 This would be analogous to the situations presented in the
Griggs and Nashville cases and compensation would be required.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate determination of the constitutionality of the permit
system method of modifying the riparian right will depend primarily
upon the weight that the Court is willing to give to the changed social
values at the time the decision must be made. The relatively small loss
to be suffered by the riparian, the inchoate nature of the property right
itself and the impending shortages of water necessitating its maximum
beneficial use all seem to indicate that the sounder conclusion would
be that reached in Consolidated and Goldblatt. A conjectural value of
the right to a future use as well as an indeterminate change in the
present value of the land seem weak grounds upon which to block the
assertion of a valid public interest.
82. The Supreme Court as recently as 1963 seems willing to admit without question, that the
taking of the riparian right is per se compensable. Although they cite the Supreme Court or
California, the Court's approval of the position of the California Court would seem to reflect
their current thinking. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 624-25 (1963).
83. The volume of literature and the tremendous expenditures directed at the problems of water
allocation in the East are indicative of the seriousness of the impending shortages in available
water. Renne & Fuleher, Legal Research in Water Resources. 4 LAND & WATER L. Rtv. 145
(1969). See also WATER ALLOCATION; WATER RESOURCES.
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